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RISK COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT  
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Ragnar Lofstedt 
ABSTRACT 
Risk management and risk communication in Europe have undergone profound changes over the 
past twenty years or so. This paper briefly outlines the changes that have occurred over time and 
discusses some of the resulting teething problems that have taken place and which now need to 
be addressed. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is fair to say that European regulation can be divided into an old model of regulatory decision 
making, that I label consensual, and a new model of regulatory decision making that I label 
participatory-transparent.1 The old model of regulatory decision making, put in place as early as 
1842 in the United Kingdom following the passage of the Factory Laws had the following 
features (e.g., see Ashby and Anderson 1981; Brickman, Jasanoff, and Ilgen 1985; Kelman 1981; 
Lundqvist 1980; Vogel 1986): 
a. It was based on consensual styles of regulation in which policymakers and industry met 
behind closed doors and made regulatory decisions; and 
b. It was elitist in nature, with regulatory decisions made in consultation with a number of 
elite groups including heads of industry, senior regulators, and representatives from trade 
unions. These groups were seen to represent society at large. 
This model of regulatory decision making was also inherently flexible. Regulators made a point 
of working out possible problems with the regulatees, be it at national and or local level. For 
example in the annual report of the British Alkali and Clean Air Inspectorate in 1973 it states 
that [t]he Chief Inspector, with the help of his deputies, lay down the broad national policies 
and, provided they keep within their broad lines, inspectors in the field have plenty of flexibility 
to take into account local circumstances and make suitable decisions (Vogel 1986, 82). 
The old consensual model of regulatory decision making was widespread throughout Europe, 
ranging from Sweden, to Germany, France, and the UK, and it was by in large praised by 
academics, industry, and regulators. As the journal Chemical and Industry in its regular reviews 
of the then UK Alkali Inspectorate argued in 1949, [t]he alkali inspectors are a remarkable body 
of men. Any inspectors who are not looked upon by the inspected as having only nuisance value 
must be remarkable, and that is most certainly the case with the alkali inspectors. They have to 
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administer an Act and a number of Orders which could easily become an intolerable nuisance to 
industry were they not intelligently and helpfully administered Ashby and Anderson 1981, 103). 
Similarly, a number of academic studies produced in the early 1980s praised the old model. In 
one thorough review comparing and contrasting chemical controls in three European nations as 
well as the United States, the authors argue that [w]hile US agencies are hampered by 
inexperience and by frequent changes in the upper echelons, European bureaucracies, 
particularly those with technical expertise, remain better insulated against the winds of electoral 
politics. Regulatory agencies are staffed by professional civil servants who are not subject to 
removal with every change in government. At the same time they are steeped in the history and 
tradition of bureaucratic decision making . . . (Brickman, Jasanoff, and Ilgen 1985, 305). 
The general public accepted these arrangements. As late as 1979, for example, only 4 percent of 
British respondents in a survey on public perceptions toward regulators felt that a close 
collaboration between industry and the regulator was improper (Hayward and Berki 1979). In 
addition, at this time there was widespread public trust throughout Europe toward policymakers 
and regulators. The public seldom became involved in the policymaking process nor were they 
expected to do so. Environmental groups who were not part of the establishment, such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, tried to get their voices heard but in more cases than not 
they were not listened to by the powers that be. The top-down form of risk communication, in 
which regulators/government communicated in a one-way fashion to the public, was the modus 
operandi. 
DECLINING LEVELS OF PUBLIC TRUST 
Since these academic studies of the 1980s, the risk communication and management climate in 
Europe has changed tremendously. The primary reason for this change has to do with the erosion 
of the general publics trust toward industry and regulators. There have been a number of 
explanations of why the publics trust toward these bodies has decreased so dramatically, 
including the rise of 24-hour television and the Internet leading to the public not having to take 
policymakers comments for granted, to the centralization of government, and the amplification 
of risk by the media (Giddens 1990; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997). 
That said, the single most important factor to the decline in public trust has to do with the sheer 
number and size of regulatory scandals that have plagued Europe over the last fifteen years or so 
(Lofstedt and Vogel 2001). Among the more significant scandals include the Belgian dioxin 
crisis of the summer of 1999, the tainted blood scandal in France, and the UK and European BSE 
(Mad Cow Disease) crisis in the 1990s. These scandals should not be underestimated. The 
Belgian dioxin crisis which involved dioxin entering the Belgian food supply via contaminated 
animal fat used in animal feed supplied to Belgian, French, and Dutch farms, for example, had 
significant repercussions. Because the Belgian government did not promptly go public with the 
knowledge of the crisis, it was accused of a self-serving cover-up leading to the resignations of 
two cabinet ministers and the ousting of the ruling party in a national election (Lok and Powell 
2000). 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 5  ·  Issue 2  ·  2004  ·  © International Public Management Network 
38 
 
The BSE crisis, in which UK government ministers continued to reassure the public that BSE 
was not transmissible to humans even after it had begun to cross species barriers, also had 
significant repercussions. John Major, the prime minister at the time of the BSE crisis, viewed it 
as the worst crisis since the 1956 Suez debacle, while the then European Commissioner for 
Agriculture Franz Fischler viewed BSE as the biggest crisis the European Union had ever had 
(Ratzan 1999). 
In terms of decline in public trust, in a fifteen-year period from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s, 
according to the World Values Survey, the publics confidence in parliament has fallen 
significantly in many European countries (Newton and Norris 2000) (see table 1). 
TABLE 1 
The Decline in Public Trust 
 Early 1980s - % Mid 1990s - % 
Finland 65  33 
Germany 51  29 
Spain 48  37 
In the countries where I have conducted most of my research, namely the UK and Sweden, the 
publics trust toward policymakers has fallen. In the UK, polls indicate that the publics trust 
decreased from 39 to 22 percent in the period 1974-1996 (House of Lords 2000), while trust in 
Swedish policymakers has declined from 65 percent in 1968 to 30 percent in 1999 (Holmberg 
and Weibull 1999). 
The issue of falling trust levels is important. First, past research indicates that it is much easier to 
destroy trust than to build it (Slovic 1993). It is therefore highly unlikely that regulators in the 
UK, for example, will be able to rebuild public trust levels to the same height as they were prior 
to the BSE scandal, although one should note that the falling trust levels have tapered off. 
Second, in research that Paul Slovic, myself, and others have done over recent years shows that 
public trust is one of the most important explanatory variables of the publics perceptions of risk 
(Lofstedt 1996). That is, if the public trusts regulators they will perceive risks to be less than 
when they do not trust regulators. In fact, there is a correlation between low public-perceived 
risk and a high level of public trust and vice versa. In sum, as the public becomes increasingly 
distrustful, the public is increasingly risk averse. 
This is one of the primary reasons why there is such a high level of public concern in the UK 
with regard to a wide range of scares ranging from food safety issues (Is it safe to eat farmed 
Scottish salmon or not?) to public health (Should my child get the MMR jab?2). Hence, in 
countries such as the UK, where public distrust is rampant, it is not surprising that risks and 
various alarms dominate the news. 
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THE NEW MODEL OF REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 
As the levels of public trust toward regulators and policymakers have declined, researchers such 
as Giandomenico Majone have concluded that the consensual model of regulatory decision 
making in Europe is now dead (Majone and Everson 2001). The number and size of the scandals 
throughout Europe made this model unacceptable in the eyes of the public. In the ashes of the 
consensual model, a new model of regulatory decision making has taken shape. 
This model, developed in an ad hoc and very much muddling through fashion, and which is 
arguably more advanced in some nations (such as the UK) than others (such as Sweden), has the 
following characteristics (European Commission 2001; Lofstedt 2004; Royal Commission for 
Environmental Pollution 1998; UK Strategy Unit 2002): 
a. It aims to be more inclusive than exclusive, encouraging greater public and stakeholder 
participation in the policymaking process, either via citizen panels or citizen juries or by 
having stakeholders participate in policymaking round tables. 
b. It calls for regulatory strategies to be completely open and transparent (e.g., putting draft 
recommendations on the Internet) and for regulators to be accountable for any policy that they 
propose. 
c. Regulators are asked to take more account of environmental and social values and to use 
the precautionary principle and other risk-averse measures more frequently. 
d. It aims for a distinct separation of risk assessment (science) from risk management 
(policymaking). 
e. Science has received a different role. The media increasingly questions scientific findings, 
and many stakeholders and the public take the view that scientists are just another 
stakeholder. 
The marked change of events is well summarized by the Health and Safety Executive in its 
study, Reducing Risks, Protecting People (1999) when it states: The need for public explanation 
of the basis for decisions about the regulation of risks now arises in wide areas of public policy-
making. In former times, the issue hardly ever featured, at least outside the circle of technical 
specialists (iii). Similarly, the conversion to the new model of regulatory decision making is 
well argued by the UK Strategy Units 2002 report on risk when it states that [d]epartments and 
agencies should make earning and maintaining public trust a priority in order to help them advise 
the public about risks they may face. There should be more openness and transparency, wider 
engagement of stakeholders and the public, wider availability of choice and more use of arms-
length bodies such as the Food Standards Agency to provide advice on risk decisions (3). 
THE TEETHING PROBLEMS 
Not everyone is happy with the new model of regulatory decision making. Many scientists and 
regulators would welcome a return of the consensual style of regulatory decision making. It is 
  
International Public Management Review  ·  electronic Journal at http://www.ipmr.net 
Volume 5  ·  Issue 2  ·  2004  ·  © International Public Management Network 
40 
 
clear, however, that Western Europe will be unable to revert to it due to the nature and depth of 
the regulatory scandals that have taken place. That said, the new model of regulation, at least as 
implemented in Europe, is not problem free. There are a series of teething problems that have 
resulted from this European experimentation. These teething problems have to date not been 
dealt with adequately in either a theoretical or practical fashion. So, what are some of the issues? 
I will now discuss the characteristics of the new approach of regulatory decision making. 
Greater Public and Stakeholder Participation 
Regulators operating in this model of decision making are encouraged to seek greater public and 
stakeholder participation. Although this is indeed a worthwhile goal it needs to be made clear 
that achieving this objective is not problem free. Participants tend to be self-selecting. Most 
people, believe it or not, do not want to participate in policymaking. They prefer to go home after 
work, put their feet up, have a glass of wine with their loved ones and discuss the day, rather than 
participate in a citizen panel. 
There are many examples of this. A few years ago I was involved in evaluating a citizen panel 
project in the North Blackforest in Baden Wurttemberg (Germany) (Lofstedt 1999). Using 
random sample techniques, the research group there invited some 5,440 citizens to participate in 
the panels. Of those asked, 198 actually accepted and 191 participated, giving a response rate of 
3.5 percent. Those that did participate had, on the whole, two things in common―they were left 
of center politically and they had time to spare―in effect, not representing the majority of the 
Christian Democratic Union-leaning Baden Wurttemberg population. Although these panels 
came up with a sensible outcome in the end, to almost everyones disbelief, the issue is still one 
of self-selection. How can we encourage the silent majority to participate even when they do not 
want to? This is an issue that needs to be addressed, otherwise the UK governments public 
participation efforts, be they with regard to the siting of a nuclear waste depository or 
determining whether the country should grow genetically modified (GM) crops, will be a waste 
of time and money. 
One way to address the conundrum of the self-selection process is to focus more on face-to-face 
ethnographic interviews rather than engage in mass public dialogue campaigns, as this would 
better uncover how the public actually perceives the risk in question. These types of studies, 
based on cognitive mapping, or mental models process, developed by Baruch Fischhoff and 
others, coordinate the knowledge of diverse experts as well as securing public understanding of 
the analytical results leading to better (proactive) risk communication strategies (Morgan et al. 
2002). 
Past research indicates that involving the public and stakeholders in the policymaking process 
does lead to greater public trust. There are two primary explanations for this. First, as Thomas 
Schelling (1960) noted, when the public and the stakeholders have been brought into the 
policymaking process early on they feel ownership of the outcome of the exercise. Second, if 
policymakers have taken note of the publics and stakeholders concerns, these same groups feel 
listened to and are more likely to accept a decision (Renn, Webler, and Wiedemann 1995). 
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However, upon further reflection, this is not as clear-cut as it seems. In many cases, for example, 
involving stakeholders can actually increase distrust in the policymaking process rather than the 
other way around. 
Some years ago I evaluated a risk communication exercise for the Swedish National Chemical 
Inspectorate with regard to banning the use of antifouling paints by pleasure boat owners 
(Lofstedt 2001). Part of the inspectorates risk communication exercise focused on engaging a 
number of stakeholders, such as the Swedish Yacht Club Association, to ensure stakeholder buy-
in. The exercise misfired as the stakeholders argued forcefully that the boat owners would 
oppose and disobey any ban. These stakeholders mentioned, for example, that they were sure 
that their members would consider sailing to Estonia and buying even nastier chemicals than 
what were available in Sweden, or buying antifouling paints via the web from other European 
countries. The associations also questioned the science that the ban was based on and told the 
Chemical Inspectorate that they felt unfairly picked on. In sum, the various Swedish boating 
federations were trying to inject distrust into the inspectorates decision for a ban to kill it off. 
They were ultimately unsuccessful, however, as the results of my study and subsequent analyses 
indicated that the Swedish boat owners wanted to protect the environment as much as possible 
and that they would be happy to comply. In this case the stakeholders wanted to promote their 
agenda at the price of destroying the boat owners trust in the policymaking process of the 
Swedish Chemical Inspectorate.3 
Regulatory Strategies Should Be Open and Transparent 
Policymakers throughout Europe and elsewhere argue that the policymaking process should be 
as transparent as possible (European Commission 2001; UK Strategy Unit 2002). This includes 
placing policy deliberations on the Internet, making actual correspondence between 
policymakers, the public, and lobbyists publicly available, and encouraging scientists to 
participate to a greater degree in the public eye. It is difficult to disagree with this. Many of the 
past regulatory scandals in Europe came to fruition primarily because the regulatory 
policymaking process was nontransparent, with decisions made behind closed doors and where 
the principal actors did not take into account a wide array of social and environmental values. 
Indeed, the issue of wider transparency in policymaking is crucial in the eyes of many 
policymakers to rebuild public trust (European Commission 2001). 
A transparent process, however, is not problem free. A series of issues arise. First, it encourages 
the public, both directly and indirectly, to make their own decisions about what food they should 
eat, what car they should buy, and what policymakers they should believe in, based either 
directly on information available via the web or through the lens of the media rather than from 
the regulators themselves. This means that the public increasingly has to make risk management 
decisions based on a number of criteria, many of which are unscientific―for example, a 
stakeholders ability to speak or an individuals charisma or looks. 
It is because of this type of environment that the public in the UK, for example, has become so 
concerned about the MMR vaccine. Also, is it in the regulators best interest to see risks 
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amplified when they should in fact be attenuated? In the farmed Scottish salmon scare, for 
example, this was caused by a number of U.S. scientists trying to act as policymakers. That is, 
using their study which showed higher levels of PCBs in farmed salmon from Scotland than 
from wild salmon caught off the coast of Alaska, and then applying U.S. EPA food consumption 
guidelines, set for anglers catching recreational fish rather than U.S. FDA, UK Food Standards 
Agency (FSA), or WHO guidelines, they concluded that the farmed salmon was unsafe to eat. 
This study, in the name of transparency, was quickly circulated throughout Europe and the U.S., 
leading to widespread concern that one should not eat farmed salmon, despite the significant 
health benefits of doing so. Is it in this case reasonable to expect the public, let alone the media, 
to compare regulatory guidelines from different agencies in different countries as a basis to 
decide whether farmed salmon is safe to eat? 
Greater transparency also leads to the development of so-called policy vacuums (Powell and 
Leiss 1997). The proposing and making of regulations are in many cases about issues 
management. In the days of consensual style regulation, regulatory decisions were not 
announced before a consensus had been reached, in effect stifling any possible debate regarding 
whether the regulation was needed in the first place. Today, in a transparent environment, the 
conflicts and deliberations are for everyone to see, and more importantly, for everyone who 
wants to, to try to influence. This causes information vacuums, as those in power, the regulators, 
are not always quick enough to respond concretely to a regulatory uncertainty, thus leaving it 
vulnerable to attack by more trusted bodies. For a body to exert its influence in this new 
environment it needs to have three things going for it; namely, public trust, a well-toned 
communication machine, and speed on the ground (for a great discussion, see Leiss 2001). 
In the UK, it is increasingly the NGOs who have earned as well as mastered these skills at the 
cost of regulators and industry. In many cases this is not a problem, as the interests of the NGOs 
are not dissimilar to those of the government, but in some cases it can be. There are many 
examples of UK regulators indirectly losing control of the regulatory agenda because of this 
policy vacuum, ranging from the recent ghost ship fiasco, to the GMO debate and the siting of a 
nuclear waste depository. If the regulators want to regain the publics trust in an era of increased 
policy transparency, they will have to address these three key factors. 
Increased transparency in the policymaking process also leads to the growth of scientific 
pluralism (Jasanoff 1990). As scientists start airing their grievances in public rather than behind 
closed doors as in the past, the likelihood of one group of scientists being pitted against another 
in the media increases exponentially. One example of this was at the height of the Swedish 
acrylamide scare in April 2002, at which time findings from rodent studies put forward by 
toxicologists showing that acrylamide was a possible human carcinogen were publicly 
questioned by epidemiologists, leading to a rise of public distrust toward scientists (Lofstedt 
2003). 
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The Use of the Precautionary Principle and the Growth of Risk Aversion 
In the new model of regulatory decision making, driven by public distrust, regulators are 
becoming increasingly risk averse. Concerned about a new possible scandal lurking around the 
corner, they take the view that it is better to be safe than sorry. In the risk-averse world, one 
regulatory philosophy that has become increasingly fashionable is that of the precautionary 
principle. 
What the precautionary principle actually means, however, is difficult to pinpoint, as studies 
indicate up to nineteen formulations (Sandin 1999), although suffice it to say that the most 
common usage of it is that one needs to take action when an activity raises threats to the 
environment or human health. Many member state countries, most notably Germany and 
Sweden, have used the precautionary principle with some degree of success for thirty years 
(Lofstedt, Fischhoff, and Fischhoff 2002), and a recent study by the European Environment 
Agency espoused the virtues of it (EEA 2001). Even the European Commission has become 
involved regarding the meaning of the precautionary principle, and in the year 2000 published a 
communication to clarify its meaning, concluding that the principle should be placed within an 
existing framework of risk management (European Commission 2000). 
There is now a concern within elements of the European Commission and elsewhere that it may 
be misused, so rather than being an added tool to a risk assessors tool box it becomes a law unto 
itself. Questionable rulings over the past few years include the European Commission's decision 
to ban the importation of groundnuts from Africa, citing the precautionary principle (although 
scientific studies indicate that eating these ground nuts increases the rate of liver cancer by 1 
death in 100 million people) (Majone 2002). If the use of the precautionary principle is to remain 
a credible regulatory tool, then it needs to be used within the parameters set out by the European 
Commissions communication, as its misuse will lead to public and stakeholder distrust of 
European regulators and worse policymaking overall. 
Separation of Risk Assessment from Risk Management 
In Europe, the delineation of risk assessment and management was for many years unclear, 
because the focus was more on determining the criteria of the risk management process while 
still taking into account that it can be influenced by social values (Fairman 1999; Fairman, Mead, 
and Williams 1998; Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution 1998). Over the past three 
years there has been a fundamental shift in this thinking. In 1998 the RCEP argued that scientists 
should not be seen to be making policy, and hence risk assessment should be separated from risk 
management. 
The European Commission has also argued that this is necessary in order to restore public trust 
in the policymaking process (e.g., Byrne 2000). Initial European research does support Byrnes 
claims. For example, a 2002 poll conducted on 3,000 consumers in the UK for the FSA, the 
agency in charge of risk assessment, indicated that 60 percent of the consumers now claim to be 
very or somewhat confident in the agencys role in protecting health with regard to food safety. 
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This is a 10 percent increase in consumer confidence levels since 2000 (FSA 2003). Similarly, 
results from the U.S., and in this case the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in the early 
1980s, does indicate that a separation of risk assessment from risk management did increase 
public trust in the regulatory body. 
The issue, however, is whether this is always a good thing. In 1996, the U.S. National Research 
Council published a report entitled Understanding Risk, which argued that the two areas should 
be combined, taking the view that all types of actors should be involved in the risk 
characterization process and that there should be continuous feedback throughout the whole risk 
management cycle. Other policymakers take the view that a separation is not practically possible, 
as the scientists in charge of the risk assessment should at least offer their advice to the 
policymakers in charge of the risk management process. 
The Role of Science 
In the new model of regulatory decision making, scientists do not play the prominent role that 
they once did. Rather, scientific results today are increasingly questioned by the media, 
stakeholders, the public, and other scientists claiming contrary evidence (OBrien 2000). There 
are several reasons for this demotion, one of which having to do with past scandals. With regard 
to BSE, for example, scientists were wrong to categorically state in the late 1980s that there was 
no link between BSE and vCJD (the human variant). In addition, studies indicate that public 
information is important and should not be quickly discounted by scientists. One study that 
strongly supports this case had to with government scientific experts pitted against Cumbrian 
sheep farmers, who had seen their sheep contaminated by radiation after the Chernobyl accident. 
The research showed that the procedures for the affected sheep, provided by scientists at the 
Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries (MAFF) and other government bodies, did not consider 
the sheep farmers local knowledge. As the MAFF scientists turned out to be wrong and the sheep 
farmers right, it led to the scientists losing their credibility in the eyes of the sheep farmers (see 
Wynne 1992, 1996). 
However, the question remains how often does this occur? Should scientists have only equal weight 
with local knowledge or stakeholder intuitions? Is the sheep case more of an exception to the rule? 
These questions are difficult to answer, but one clearly needs to take into account the consequences 
of downplaying scientific results in the setting of regulations. For example, by not focusing enough 
on the scientific dimension, the media has amplified the controversy around the MMR jab as a 
national health risk, with more than 50 percent of the public now confused as to whether there is a 
link between the jab and child autism (although this may now be shifting following Wakefields 
study being recently discredited) and concerns around whether British industries should be involved 
in boat disposal. In sum, ignoring science can be perilous. 
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The new model of regulatory decision making, as outlined in this article, is here to stay. The 
levels of public distrust toward authorities are simply too high to consider anything else. Yet 
there are many issues that still need to be analyzed and resolved. If policymakers are 
encouraging greater public participation in the policymaking process, how can we reduce self-
selection bias? How can we ensure that the stakeholders participating in the policymaking 
process really want to build trust? How can we ensure that transparency in policymaking does 
not lead to unnecessary amplification of risks and public confusion? What is needed to halt the 
misuse of the precautionary principle? These and related issues key to the formation of the new 
regulatory model need further attention and analyses in order to ensure the development of a 
better regulatory framework for Europe, taking into account the needs for improving public 
health and the environment. 
Ragnar Lofstedt, Kings Centre for Risk Management, Kings College London, England, United 
Kingdom 
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1. The idea of dividing regulation into and old and new models comes from an excellent article 
by William Leiss (2000) who applies it to Canadas risk management experience. 
2. The MMR jab refers to the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine. There has been a heated 
debate in the UK as to whether infants should be given this vaccine, as one UK scientific study 
suggested a link between the MMR vaccine and autism. Although this study (initially published 
in Lancet in 1998) was based on a small sample size and has yet to be replicated in either the UK 
or anywhere else in the world, it led to massive media and public outcry. In fact, today some 50 
percent of the UK general public believe that there may be a link between autism and the MMR 
vaccine, even though a vast majority of medical experts dispute such a link. Public concern about 
the MMR vaccine has led to take-up levels of the vaccine falling in the UK from approximately 
90 percent in 1998 to just over 80 percent in 2002. 
3. It should, however, be made clear that on the whole and in many cases the policy preferences 
of interest group members are more likely to reflect those of the general public than those of the 
leaders of these special interest groups. One of the main reasons for this is that the leaders of the 
special interest groups must justify themselves and therefore take a more radical position than 
that of their members (Downs 1957; Ellis and Thompson 1997; Zald and McCarthy 1987). 
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